Introduction
The Black Sea region was, for a long time, a confusing and heterogeneous area of mixed cultures, influences and interests. At the periphery of all ancient and modern empires from the West, North-East or South, the basin of the Black Sea represented for centuries a meeting place, but also a fault line for various civilisations, religions, ethnicities, nations and minorities. It is already commonplace to say that the Black Sea works as a crossroads for the main West-East and North-South strategic corridors connecting the European peninsula with the Eurasian bloc, as well as with the Middle East. Neal Ascherson even names the region "the birthplace of civilisation and barbarism" but, coming to recent tensions between Russia and the West, he also observes that "because of this rivalry, the Black Sea is no longer considered 'peripheral' by European and American leaders.
Increasingly, the region is 'courted' by conferences, 'action plans' and 'neighbourhood policies'" (Ascherson 2007: xii) .
The role of this geopolitical pivot is somehow valid even today. Articulating the eastern neighbourhood with the southern neighbourhood of the western world, represented mainly by the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, the Black Sea region keeps its strategic significance in contemporary international politics. The shocking annexation of Crimea in March 2014 brought back into international attention the strategic and geopolitical value of this once considered peripheral region.
In the narrow sense of having Black Sea coasts, only six countries can be considered as part of the region: Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia. Nevertheless, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), established in 1992 in Istanbul, has 12 member states: the six already mentioned plus Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, the The Black Sea is surrounded today by a 'belt' of frozen conflicts and instability, on the North, East and South. Looking at Crimea, East of Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and its separatist regions, the South Caucasus, and even a turbulent and confused Turkey, we understand how much potential for conflict and instability there is in the region. On the western shore, Romania and Bulgaria are both EU and NATO member states, the presumption being that simultaneous membership to these two essential political, economic and military structures of the Western order is an indication for more predictability and stability in national politics. However, the election of the new Bulgarian president in November 2016, the socialist retired general Rumen Radev, considered by local and European mass-media an ambiguous if not a real 'pro-Russian leader' (Euronews 2016) , places Bulgaria in a new and rather unclear light.
Although united by a pro-West strategic option, the three NATO member Traditionally, Bulgaria has had more substantial relations and sympathy for Russia due to its Slavic cultural roots, and this is still valid today. In Romania, maybe more than everywhere else in the Southeast Europe and the Black Sea region, a political, elitist and popular Russophobic feeling is present (Tsygankov 2009 ) that was evident even before 1989. This feeling manifested as a deep anti-Soviet attitude, making Bucharest one of the most fervent Antlanticist/pro-NATO/pro-US capitals on the European continent in the past two decades.
Based on a comparative qualitative research method, specifically discourse theory, this article examines the political discourses on NATO of the three allies with Black Sea coasts: Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.
High-ranking officials but also significant opposition leaders will be taken into consideration. The research question is whether recent international developments with the ascension of nationalist and populist parties, the crisis of the European Union, the failed coup attempt in Turkey or the weakening of transatlantic relations have prompted changes in these states' orientation and perspectives with regard to NATO. Political elites are taken into consideration, both from the government and opposition side, in order to foreshadow possible developments in the coming years and explore NATO perspectives in the region.
The article is structured in five sections. After the introduction and the theoretical framework, the analysis approaches the Black Sea NATO allies into two distinct sections/categories: Romania and Bulgaria are treated together as EU member states, then Turkey, a non-EU country with a Muslim majority, having a vast part of its territory on the Asian continent and massive connections with the Middle East. The last section contains the conclusions.
Conceptual framework, strategic approaches and doctrines of security in the Black Sea region Being a region of confluence with very different historic, political and cultural traditions, the basin of the Black Sea used to bring together Western oriented and Eastern oriented regimes. Russia and Turkey were always the two most important powers at the Black Sea, so it was essential for the United States to get a strategic ally in the region during the Cold War. That steady ally was, for almost a half-century, Turkey.
Robert Kaplan connects the second NATO extension to the East with the Kosovo war. In 1999 Romania allowed American bombers to use its airspace in order to strike at the targets of the Milosevich regime and that political attitude of Bucharest gave strategic value to the entire subregion of Southeast Europe: "the war of Kosovo in 1999, like the attacks of 9/11, legitimated the subsequent extension of the NATO area as far as the Black Sea" (Kaplan 2014: 55) . Even after the second wave of the Alliance's eastern enlargement, diversity remained the most relevant "In Europe, the NATO structure symbolized the inability of individual states to defend themselves. But American involvement all along the periphery of the Soviet sphere merely staked out the boundaries for the forward defence of the United States" (Buzan 1991: 283) .
Various definitions of security give an image of what interests the Black
Sea states may have in joining NATO. Some of these conceptualizations see the issue of national security in its basic, realist perspectives: "national security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from aboard" (Luciani 1989: 151) . Other approaches speak about national values and adversities: "national security is that part of government policy having as its object the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries" (Trager and Simonie 1973: 36) .
The most comprehensive definitions take into consideration both external and internal threats: As former members of the defunct Warsaw Pact with rather medium/ small military power, both Romania and Bulgaria developed in the 1990s and 2000s, before and after their accession to NATO, a pro-West policy which was intended to ensure that the United States and NATO umbrella of security will fully cover them in the future.
Turkey has a different experience with NATO and to some extent a different approach, which is reflected in its focus on regional affairs, including Ankara's strategic interests in some NATO neighbourhoods such as the In the words of Gustav Schmidt, "NATO is often said to be the child or twin of the Cold War […but] NATO was something more, which allowed it to survive the end of the East-West conflict: it institutionalized political consultation and cooperation" (Schmidt 2014: 46) . The switch of the great powers' focus from the concept of hard power to the concept of soft power after the end of the Cold War, corresponded to a parallel shift of NATO from a military focus to a new political and normative focus. This is a significant change for the Black Sea region and its NATO member states, where two out of the three allies (Romania and Bulgaria) were accepted in the frame of the new democratic and liberal paradigm, while the third member state (Turkey) owes its membership to the old Truman Doctrine and the strategies of the Cold War.
In the post-Cold War era, NATO has faced critical questions and sometimes seemed outdated in relation to new security challenges. The idea that NATO in the 21st century is obsolete and suffering a decline in political support from its member states, is rejected by several authors. According to Sebastian Mayer, "declinists forecasting NATO's demise have been proven wrong. The related crisis rhetoric ('NATO is in its worst crisis ever') with its often vague terminology has somewhat subsided" (Mayer 2014: 316 partner if a threat emerged" (Novinite 2017) , while the vast majority of NATO member states prefer the United States as their main partner in terms of national defence. The same survey confirmed that Bulgaria and Greece see their biggest security threat coming from Turkey, an ally within NATO.
The observation that four NATO member states, that is a large part of the region of Southeast Europe, 'rely' more on Russia than on the US for their defence, is obviously surprising and somehow illogical for the Alliance.
However, this is explained by the finding that two of them, Bulgaria and Greece, consider another NATO member state, that is, neighbouring Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca:
"We will continue to rotate U.S. naval vessels into the Black Sea, but it will not be on a level that can rival Russia's naval presence in the Black Sea. While we will continue to provide credible deterrence in other realms to our three NATO Black Sea Allies, it will be dependent on these three nations to work even closer together to bolster common security, especially in the naval realm. There are many things these three states can and should be doing to improve NATO military capabilities in and around the Black Sea. The first step would be to meet often at high and working levels to discuss the security picture, their capabilities, and how they can work together. The U.S. is happy to play a supporting role in this" (Hans Klemm 2017: 65) .
It is not a surprise to observe that the US government chose to make clear this Turkey's position itself differs substantially when it comes to the European Union and NATO. President Erdoğan became much more assertive in relation to the European Union in the past two years, even threatening a referendum for cancelling negotiations for joining the EU, while the topic of NATO membership is kept in silence. The most reasonable explanation for this different attitude is that Ankara realizes it has no chances of joining the European Union, but NATO membership could be useful for its security one day, in the turbulent region of the Middle East.
The cancelation of Turkey's participation to many NATO exercises could be explained by the worsening relations with some European allies, such as the Netherlands, France and Germany. Erdoğan even named some
Western European governments as "Nazis", after the interdictions on "Erdogan is a failure. But he is also a growing threat to U.S. interests.
His policies are certainly endangering the well-being and stability of Turkey, a vital member of NATO. But they are also fanning the flames of extremism and terrorism beyond Turkey's borders -in Syria and the Middle East for sure, but increasingly in Europe as well. The country that is supposed to be a reliable bulwark for security and stability on NATO's southern flank is fast becoming a major source of risk to both the alliance's democratic values and, and more importantly, its interests" (Hannah 2016 ).
For his part, President Erdoğan does not seem to be very happy with the current NATO programmes and would like to see the Alliance more involved in "fighting global terrorism". To some extent, it makes sense that any of NATO's member states would like to attract more of the Alliance's interest in their regions and to their specific problems, but any "out of area operation" should be evaluated and prepared with much caution, especially in a sensitive region such as the Middle East. The Turkish leader considers that:
"As we have seen from the terrorist attacks first in Istanbul and then in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, international security is becoming more fragile […] The concept of a security threat is undergoing a serious change. In this process, NATO needs to be more active and has to update itself against the new security threats. As a NATO country, we want fellow members not to forget about Turkey" (Pamuk 2016 ).
The implication of NATO in Middle East conflicts is not something that western allies are ready to decide, despite Turkey's insistence. Moreover, This article shows that the traditional heterogeneity of the Black Sea region is reflected today even between the three NATO member states, influencing their commitment to the Alliance's purposes and strategies.
From the north/Romania to the south/Turkey of the Black Sea region, with some ambiguity in-between/Bulgaria, the previously pro-West attitude is visibly decreasing. Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey fully represent the three different nuances depicted in this paper: stability, ambiguity and change.
In comparison with the north of NATO's Eastern Flank, which seems more united in its strategic options and a more coherent region, articulated between Poland and the Baltic States, the south of the Eastern Flank looks weaker, heterogeneous and increasingly divergent. This reality should be treated seriously by NATO strategists and decision-makers.
